By Nikos Tsafos
The crisis in Ukraine has renewed the call for the United States government to boost natural gas exports in order to aid allies in need and lessen Europe’s reliance on Russian gas. Gas exports, the argument goes, could even accord the United States potent leverage in a crisis like the one in Ukraine. Yet Ukraine is also a reminder of the limits of energy diplomacy: a review of Russia’s effort to cajole and punish Ukraine through gas since 2006 should serve as a playbook to avoid not a blueprint to follow. The United States should learn the limits of energy “weapons” rather than renew its dedication to yield them.
The gas relationship between Russia and Ukraine has been bitter and complicated, but broadly speaking, Russia has linked the price that Ukraine pays for gas to Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. As energy prices rose in the 2000s, the gap between what Europe paid for Russian gas and what the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries paid for Russian gas widened—by 2005, Russia charged Europe three times more than the FSU. The Orange Revolution in late 2004–early 2005, and the subsequent deterioration in relations between Russia and Ukraine, made the discount for Ukraine more untenable, and so Russia raised prices. It was in support of these hikes, and other disputes from this opaque trade, that Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas giant, cut off gas to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009.
Source: nationalinterest.org
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